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JUDICIAL ABDICATION AND EQUAL
ACCESS TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
Gene R. Nichol, Jr.t
There has been, of late, much talk of the Roberts Court's
constricting view of access to the judicial system. Its tight standing
decisions,' its embrace of more potent Eleventh Amendment and
2common law immunities, its enthusiastic retrenchment of habeas
corpus,3 its aversion to facial and vagueness challenges,4  its
emboldened standards of federal preemption, its unfolding limits on
t Professor of Law and Director, Center on Poverty, Work and Opportunity, University
of North Carolina. Thanks to Erwin Chemerinsky, Bill Marshall, and Mike Gerhardt for
comments on an earlier draft. Thanks also to Jabeen Ahmad, Tarik Jallad, and Clay Turner for
terrific research on access to justice.
I See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007) (imposing
arbitrary limitations on jurisdiction to challenge federal expenditures to further religion);
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) (making an analogous restrictive reading
of Article 1H standing requirements).
2 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (making summary judgment more
readily available in constitutional tort cases); Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 864-65
(2009) (bolstering prosecutorial immunity from § 1983 claims); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd.
of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296-97 (2006) (limiting liability for states that take federal
funds accompanied by ambiguous conditions).
3 See, e.g., Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1422 (2009) (remanding with
instructions to deny habeas petition for failure to adequately demonstrate ineffective assistance
of counsel); Allen v. Siebert, 128 S. Ct. 2, 4-5 (2007) (per curiam) (finding that an inmate was
not entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations for a habeas
claim); Fry v. Pliler, 127 S. Ct. 2321, 2327-28 (2007) (holding that the district court did not err
in applying a more deferential Brecht standard when assessing the state court's alleged
prejudicial impact of constitutional error). But see Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277
(2008) (extending the constitutional writ of habeas corpus to detainees at Guantanamo Bay).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830 (2008) (rejecting a vagueness
challenge in a child pornography case).
5 See Reigel v. Medtronic, Inc. 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 (2008) (finding state common law
tort claims to be preempted by the Medical Device Amendments Act of 1976, 21 U.S.C. §
360k); Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 128 S. Ct. 989, 995 (2008) (holding that the
FAAAA preempted state tobacco delivery laws); and Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 987
(2008) (holding that when parties agree to arbitrate a dispute, the Federal Arbitration Act
preempts state laws placing jurisdiction in another forum).
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punitive damages,6 and more, have led many to conclude that the
high court, under the Chief Justice's leadership, will significantly
curtail the availability of the federal judicial forum.8  Even the
often-cranky Wall Street Journal could enthuse that "the biggest
change under Chief Justice John Roberts might not involve who wins
on the merits. Rather, it may be who gets through the courthouse door
in the first place."9 Less here is thought, perhaps, to be more, or, at
least, better.
It is not my purpose to make light of such musings. I have, truth
told, partaken occasionally of them myself.10 Nothing pleases the
palate of a federal courts aficionado like the endless dissection of the
intricacies of our national jurisdiction. But these exhortations explore,
at best, the lawyers' vision of access to the halls of justice. They
cobble and patch at the edges of traditional patterns of judicial power.
They suggest, in particularized terms, that cases might be brought
earlier or later, or via different groups of plaintiffs, or under more
imposing barriers, or against keener shields of liability. They might
even mean that limited categories of disputes, previously thought
amenable to judicial process, are now relegated to the fickle tides of
democratic decision making. The scales of justice notwithstanding,
or, even, be damned-no tiny matters these.
Still, any perceptive discussion of access to our judicial system
with a probing visitor from a distant culture or clime would surely
begin and, perhaps end, on a much different front. She would be more
6 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2634 (2008) (upholding the lower
court's limitation on punitive damages awarded by a jury); Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 549
U.S. 346, 356-58 (2007) (bolstering limitations on punitive damages claims).
7 For example, the Court's restrictive reading of statutes of limitations. See Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 628-29 (2007) (imposing a restrictive statute of
limitations for filing a complaint with the EEOC in Title VII cases), superseded by statute, Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
8 See Jonathan N. Crawford, Bush's Lasting Legacy: A Pro-Business Judiciary,
KIPLINGER LETTER, Mar. 10, 2008, available at http://www.kiplinger.com/businessresource/
forecast/archive/BushLeaves_a_LastingLegacy_080310.html (arguing that the Roberts Court
takes a "pro-business" approach in restricting access to the federal judiciary); Jeffrey Toobin,
Five to Four, NEW YORKER, June 25, 2007, at 35 (discussing the drastic transformation of the
Supreme Court under Roberts).
9 Jess Bravin, Court Under Roberts Limits Judicial Power, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2007, at
Al.
10 See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., The Roberts Court and Access to Justice, 59 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (challenging standing doctrine as neutral access principle);
Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301
(2002) (criticizing implementation of Article Il standing rules); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness
and the Constitution, 54 U. CI. L. REV. 153 (1987) (dissecting mootness standards-
constitutional and prudential); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegration of Article III,
74 CAL. L. REv. 1915 (1986) (challenging restrictions on access to federal courts); Gene R.
Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 635 (1985)
(same); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., An Activism ofAmbivalence, 98 HARV. L. REv. 315 (1984) (same).
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interested, I'm guessing, in our strongest and most pervasive
transgression against access and equality-the exclusion from the
effective use of our civil justice system of that huge portion of the
American populace who cannot afford to pay the fare. We have
constructed, honed and maintained an immensely complicated,
arcane, formal, imposing and mystifying structure for the
government-enforced resolution of civil disputes. Almost no one,
unschooled in its specialized practices, could conceivably navigate its
corridors. We have, at least occasionally, conceded as much."
Lawyers are the necessary triggers of its determinatively adversarial
processes. Cases are to be investigated, explored, organized,
researched, presented, rebutted, and appealed. They are not
self-executing. Lay Americans cannot here sensibly proceed on their
own.
But, as is widely known, lawyers cost money. Some of us have it;
many do not. Yet, beyond a tiny category of disputes, and unlike
many Western democratic nations, we recognize no affirmative right
to counsel in civil cases.12 And it shows. Study after demoralizing
study demonstrates, with daunting and repetitive consistency, that
over eighty percent of the legal need of the poor and the near poor-a
cohort including at least ninety million Americans-is unmet. 13 As a
result, these economically marginalized citizens are left outside the
bounds of the effective use of our adjudicatory systems, state and
I" See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (arguing, in the context of a
criminal case, that one "unfamiliar with the rules of evidence" and "lack[ing] ... the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he ha[d] a perfect one," is denied
effective access to counsel and to a fair trial (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69
(1932)).
12 See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 7 (2004) ("Unlike most other
industrialized nations, the United States recognizes no right to legal assistance for civil matters
and courts have exercised their discretion to appoint counsel in only a narrow category of
cases.").
13 See id. at 3-4, 7, 13 ("[L]egal services offices can handle less than a fifth of the needs
of eligible clients and often are able to offer only brief advice, not the full range of assistance
that is necessary."); Gene R. Nichol, The Charge of Equal Justice, JUDGES' J., Summer 2008, at
38; Peter Edelman,... And A Law for Poor People, NATION, Aug. 3, 2009, at 23-24; ALAN W.
HOuSEMAN, CTR. FOR LAw & SOC. POL'Y, CIVIL LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
UPDATE FOR 2009, at 10 (July 2009), http:// www.clasp.org/admin/site/publications/
files/0373.pdf (citing an ABA study that found that the less than twenty percent of low-income
Americans' legal needs were being met); LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE
GAP IN AMERICA-THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS
(2009), http://www.1sc.gov/pdfs/documenting-thejustice-gap-inamerica 2009.pdf; ABA
TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 112A, at 5
n.6 (2006), http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/06A1l2A.pdf (noting seven
recent state studies in Oregon, Vermont, New Jersey, Connecticut, Tennessee, Illinois and
Montana, which indicated that "only a very small percentage of the legal problems experienced
by low-income people (typically one in five or less) is addressed with the assistance of a private
or legal aid lawyer").
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federal. Crucial disputes, frequently involving the most vital
questions of life-divorce, child custody, domestic violence, health
care, shelter, subsistence, life-sustaining benefits-are either rejected,
ignored, or determined under terms of extraordinary imbalance, as a
result of the absence of counsel. And we know it.14
"How," our curious and persistent visitor might ask, "can you
struggle so vigorously over the relative mite of what you call taxpayer
standing while ignoring the timber, or perhaps the great oak forest, of
near-total economic exclusion? "What passes for civil justice among
your have-nots is a charade, or less."' 5 "I should have thought you
would understand that 'there can be no equal justice where the kind of
trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."' 1 6 "Do you,
in fact, even consider this to be a SYSTEM of justice?" "Can any
system, pretending fairness, be squared with the recognition that large
segments of society are simply unable to effectively employ its
mechanisms? What is it, after all, that you carve on your courthouse
walls?""
The literal chasm that exists between our aspiration of "equal
justice under law" and the actual exclusionary operation of our civil
justice system has hardly gone unnoticed. Scholars have documented
both its breadth and its impact. Bar association studies and state
equal justice commissions have decried it.19 National coalitions have
surged to contest it.2 0 Law school curricula have expanded (though
' President Carter put it, famously, in words that I wish were exaggeration: "Ninety
percent of our lawyers serve ten percent of our people. We are overlawyered and
underrepresented." Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 369, 371 (2004).
15 See generally RHODE, supra note 12 (outlining the gap between our purported
principles regarding equal justice and the realities regarding its true availability).
16 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (plurality opinion).
17 refer, of course, to our sometimes-mocking inscribed refrain, "equal justice under
law." Supreme Court of the United States, The Court Building 2 (2010), http://www.supreme
courtus.gov/about/courtbuilding.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
Is See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 12, at 13-14 ("[M]illions of Americans are locked out of
law entirely. Millions more attempt to represent themselves in a system stacked against them.");
Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices
in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992); Earl Johnson, Jr., Equal Access to Justice:
Comparing Access to Justice in the United States and Other Industrial Democracies, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S83 (2000); Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on
Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New York City's Housing Court: Results of a Randomized
Experiment, 35 LAw & Soc'y REv. 419 (2001); LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 13; ABA
TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 13.
19 See, e.g., COLO. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM'N, THE JUSTICE CRISIS IN COLORADO: A
REPORT ON THE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF THE INDIGENT IN COLORADO 5 (2008), http://
www.cobar.org/repository/Access%20to%20Justice/O8ATJFULLReport.pdf (acknowledging
that "Colorado faces a serious crisis in civil legal representation of the indigent"); ABA TASK
FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 10-12, (reporting state developments
aimed at increasing indigent access to counsel).
2 See generally Brennan Center for Justice, http://www.brennancenter.org/pages/about/
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too modestly) to explore it.2 1 The American Bar Association and
many of its state counterparts have passed passionate resolutions to
condemn it.22 Activists have crafted strategies to challenge it.23
Meantime, huge numbers of our fellows "lose their families, their
housing, their livelihood, and like fundamental interests" as the result
of the want of counsel.24 Even more telling, a system of adjudication
premised on the foundational notion that all parties are entitled to a
meaningful chance to participate and to contest any adverse decision
before a loss of liberty or property occurs, stands this foundational
norm soundly upon its head. And this hypocrisy, which resides
squarely at the core of the American system of justice, remains
securely unmolested. In fact, given the dramatic economic challenges
25of 2008, 2009 and, one guesses, 2010, the cancer grows.
This Article explores one cornerstone of the American
embarrassment of access to justice-the decisions and the obligations
of judges. Judicial response to the excision of the poor and near poor
from the civil adjudication process is not the only trigger of our
extraordinary and indefensible flight from fairness. Lawyers, bar
associations, law schools, faculties, legislatures (state and federal),
(last visited Jan. 29, 2010) (declaring the Brennan Center's focus on "fundamental issues of
democracy and justice"); National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel, http://www.civil
righttocounsel.org/who-we-are/about the-coalition/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2010) (stating the
Coalition's mission to be "ensuring meaningful access to the courts for all").
21 See Gene R. Nichol, The Command of Equal Justice, 31 COLO. LAW. 57, 58 (2002)
(noting that "[i]ssues of access to justice are either missing or marginalized in [law school]
curricula").
22 See ABA TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 1 (stating that
the American Bar Association "urges federal, state, and territorial governments to provide legal
counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low income persons ... where basic human
needs are at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody");
HOUSEMAN, supra note 13 (outlining state bar responses to ABA resolution).
23 See generally Laura K. Abel, Toward a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases in New York
State: A Report of the New York State Bar Association, 25 TOuRO L. REV. 31 (2009) (discussing
the potential methods of expanding the right to counsel for an array of civil law issues);
Conference, An Obvious Truth: Creating an Action Blueprint for a Civil Right to Counsel in
New York State, 25 TOuRO L. REV. 1 (2009), available at http://www.tourolaw.edullawreview/
Vol25_Nol_2009.html (noting the conference's purpose of "advanc[ing] an enormously
important discussion . . . about how [to] go about securing a right to counsel in civil legal
matters affecting fundamental needs for people who cannot afford legal help").
24 ABA TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 10 ("[E]very day the
administration of justice is threatened ... by the erosion of public confidence caused by lack of
access." (alteration in original) (quoting Ronald George, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of
California, State of Judiciary Speech to California Legislature (2001))).
2 See Tony Pugh, Growing Numbers of Poor People Swamp Legal Aid Ofices,
MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, July 9, 2009, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/homepage/v
-print/story/71580.html ("After years of funding shortfalls, legal aid societies across the country
are being overwhelmed by growing numbers of poor and unemployed Americans who face
eviction, foreclosure, bankruptcy and other legal problems tied to the recession. The crush of
new clients comes as the cash-strapped agencies cut staff and services.")
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governors, and presidents, too, have played their respective parts. 2 6
But judges-state and federal-shoulder a singular and defining role
in creating, maintaining, and assuring open, effective, and meaningful
access to the system of justice they administer. United States Supreme
Court Justices, federal court judges, state supreme court justices, and
state trial and appellate jurists work atop a massive, monopolistic,
government-proffered, violence-secured system for the orderly
resolution of civil disputes. They determine, in actual and concrete
ways, the nature and scope of our concept of constitutionally
commanded fairness-the "process" "due" in a regime of equal
citizenship and dignity. They, in generation after generation, put flesh
upon the unfolding requirements of a meaningful right to participate
and to be heard, without which the state's techniques for binding
conflict resolution cannot be justified.27 They set, quite literally, the
constitutive markers of legitimate judicial decision making. Common
law courts and their constitutional successors have done so for
centuries.28 In short, it is "emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department" 29 to gauge and ensure the essential fairness and
integrity of its proceedings. But American judges have abdicated this
central mission by ignoring the exclusion from our civil regime that
occurs for those unable to afford counsel.
This does not mean that judges have been uniformly silent and
unconcerned about the wholesale distortion of effective and useful
access occurring daily in the courtrooms they administer. Thoughtful
jurists, both state and federal, decry economic exclusion, and its
painful impacts, in moving terms.30 But they do so now, ironically,
26 See Nichol, The Charge of Equal Justice, supra note 13, at 39 ("And spanning the
profession, I fear that we have all played our parts."); Thomas W. Lambeth & Gene Nichol,
Access to Justice, N.C. ST. B.J., Spring 2008, at 12 (noting the shortcomings of various
professions in addressing the problem); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Educating for Privilege, NATION,
Oct. 13, 2003, at 22-24 (noting how the extremely high costs of a law school education fence
out a large part of society).
27 At least that is the way Justice Harlan put it almost forty years ago in Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971) ("Without [a constitutional] guarantee that one may not
be deprived of his rights, neither liberty nor property, without due process of law, the State's
monopoly over techniques for binding conflict resolution could hardly be said to be acceptable.
28 See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956) (plurality opinion) ("Providing
equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike is an age-old problem. People have
never ceased to hope and strive to move closer to that goal. This hope, at least in part, brought
about in 1215 the royal concessions of Magna Carta." (footnote omitted)).
29 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). The Marbury language is
borrowed here from a modestly distinct context.
3 See, e.g., ABA TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 10
("[E]very day the administration of justice is threatened ... by the erosion of public confidence
caused by lack of access." (quoting Ronald George, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of California,
State of Judiciary Speech to California Legislature (2001))); Robert W. Sweet, Civil "Gideon"
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primarily in law day speeches, or at legal aid banquets, or in reports to
the bar, or before equal justice commissions, or in law school
graduation homilies, or, perhaps, before state legislative oversight
committees. Not in their rulings. It is almost as if Justice Earl Warren,
upon studying the horrors of educational apartheid, decided to take a
couple of school superintendents to lunch or talk to the local Rotary
Club, rather than pen Brown v. Board of Education.31 The rejection of
a judicially imposed right to effective access and participation by the
poor is apparently thought to be so complete and unshakeable that
jurists now see the challenge as principally a political or an ethical
one. Judges may have developed, overseen, and implemented a
dispute resolution system sufficiently complex and costly that many
cannot deploy it. It is the obligation of others, however, to repair their
work.
The overarching denial of equal access to our system of civil
justice may be stunningly at odds with what we say we believe, but
judges, somehow, are distinct from the sin. It has no impact on the
essential validity of their endeavor. It presents no challenge to the
heart of their undertaking or to the oaths of office they avow. Their
hands are, somehow, clean. If they are able to offer the fruits and the
majesty of their processes only to those of significant economic
means, such is the way of the world. If the poorest must be gently, or
even cruelly, cast aside, there it is. Under this view, the inherent
judicial obligation to assure a meaningful opportunity to participate in
a meaningful forum is not a serious undertaking. Empty formalism
will do. Both the rich and the poor are free to engage the utterly
requisite and profoundly expensive services of expert counsel. If one
seeks relief from the impact of this bewildering transgression,
American jurists effectively suggest that he turn elsewhere. The
good-hearted among them, it seems, might even be willing to help
make the case. But don't argue that they are obliged, in their own
arenas, to squarely face the monster. Actual justice must be the writ
of those who work in other venues. God knows why.
This Article argues that the removal from our constitutional
agenda of the question whether the guarantee of meaningful access to
a fair hearing in the civil justice system demands the affirmative
provision of counsel-a removal that has effectively occurred at least
since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lassiter v.
and Justice in the Trial Court (the Rabbi's Beard), 52 RECORD 915 (1997).
31 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Department of Social Services in 1981 32 -is a rank and unacceptable
betrayal of our defining commitment to constitutionalism. Due
process of law is an amorphous notion. It is also a searching and
skeptical one-looking past the claims of unexamined and untenable
habit. It is the "least frozen concept of our law-the least confined to
history" and most seamlessly linked to the powerful social standards
that mark us as a progressive society.33 Its commands are not merely
"theoretical or illusory," but also "practical and effective."34 it
addresses itself to actualities-forcing action when the gap between
theory and reality becomes too far attenuated.
No non-cynical vision of due process of law--demanding, as it
does, a reality-driven examination of the meaningful opportunity to
participate-can be squared with the exclusion of massive numbers of
litigants from the effective use of the justice system. The fact that
American judges continue to pretend otherwise, with or without the
blush of embarrassment, is a clear indication of the facile nature of
our commitment to the rule of law. The dereliction is defining. It
renders suspect both the assertion and the implementation of our
foundational norms. Curiously, most Western democracies, though
they talk less about commitments to equal justice, do far more.35
During Justice Sotomayor's recent Senate hearings, Lindsay Graham
pompously claimed "the hope of the world, really, [is] that our legal
system, even though we fail at times, will spread." 36 Sadly, as the
poor and near poor of the United States could explain to Senator
Graham, it is not so. Not so, at least, until we better match the reality
of our system of civil adjudication to the promise of equal justice
upon which it purports to be based.
Part I will briefly explore how we arrived in our present
circumstance of recognizing a significant and broadly applicable right
to counsel in criminal cases while simultaneously rejecting similar
treatment for civil cases, except in a very narrow category of
family-related disputes. 37 In a series of decisions from the 1950s
32 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
3 These are the words not of a liberal firebrand but of the ever-cautious Justice Felix
Frankfurter over a half-century ago. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 20-21 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
judgment).
3 Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 12 (1979) (discussing the importance of
procedural guarantees under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms).
3 See, e.g., infra note 119.
3 Sotomayor Confirmation Hearings, Day 2, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2009, http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/07/14/us/politics/14confirm-text.html?pagewanted=57&_r-l &ref=politics.
3 See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26-27 (stating a broad, but largely unexplained, presumption
against right to counsel in civil cases); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 448-50 (1973)
(refusing to grant a right to a fee waiver for poor litigants in bankruptcy cases). But see Boddie
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through the early 1980s, the United States Supreme Court recognized
a growing tension between its burgeoning due process and equal
protection mandates, and the frequent de facto (and, sometimes, de
jure) exclusion of the poor from effective use of the civil justice
system. Procedures which meant that those unable to pay various
fees, purchase transcripts, post expensive bonds, or, occasionally,
afford counsel, could not be readily reconciled with either the rights
of meaningful participation or the equal citizenship of the
impoverished. 38 Accordingly, modest steps were taken, under the Due
Process or Equal Protection Clauses, to assure more effective access
to those unable to proffer the costs of litigation. These unfolding
patterns began to be significantly curbed by the Burger Court in the
mid-1970s. A few years later, they were brought to a stilted halt in
Lassiter.39 Although the decision purported to offer a fact-sensitive
approach to the possible recognition of a right to counsel in particular
civil actions, it has been understood, and applied, to bar right to
counsel claims in virtually all civil cases.4
Part II examines the operation of the Lassiter line of decisions in
the state courts. Lassiter developed a potent presumption against the
recognition of a right to civil counsel. It did so despite claiming to
employ, in some fashion, the broad-ranging procedural due process
balancing inquiry traceable to Mathews v. Eldridge.4 1 In the almost
three decades since Lassiter was handed down, state supreme courts
wishing to more meaningfully address the contradiction of economic
exclusion might have taken either of two more promising paths. First,
they could have actually turned to a fact-based, individualized, open
inquiry across the spectrum of civil actions, exploring the nature and
complexity of the dispute and the likely resulting destruction of the
ability to participate without counsel. In other words, state courts
could have done what Lassiter pretended to do, but didn't. The cases
starkly reveal, however, that this has not occurred.42 Second, state
jurists could plausibly have concluded that Lassiter's closed door was
v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-82 (1971) (requiring fee waiver in a divorce case because of
the fundamental right to marry and to end a marriage).
38 See infra notes 51-75.
3 See supra text accompanying note 32.
40 See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) ("In sum,. . . this Court has not
extended Griffin to the broad array of civil cases. But tellingly, the Court has consistently set
apart from the mine run of cases those involving ... intrusions on family relationships.").
41 See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). The
Mathews Court employed a balancing test that weighed the importance of the interest at stake,
the strength of the government's justification, and the risk of error under the challenged process.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
42 See discussion infra Part II.
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based, in no small measure, on federalism grounds. Perhaps no
searching national standard would be mandated; the problem is too
large for "one-size-fits-all" conclusions. Still, state laboratories
should experiment boldly to bring our civil justice practices more
closely in line with our famously declared constitutional aspirations.43
Broadly speaking, state court systems have failed to answer this call
as well. Instead, states have overwhelmingly explored civil counsel
claims by asking only whether the dispute in question is closely akin
to the narrow category of family-procreative rulings in which the
federal courts have mandated special solicitude for the indigent."
This has rendered the right to civil counsel question little more than a
footnote to the enforcement of a constitutional right to privacy. The
irony that state courts can create and administer complex, binding,
and monopolistic dispute resolution regimes, while remaining
agnostic about whether large segments of their citizenry are barred
from deploying them, goes unaddressed in much the same way as it
does in federal tribunals.
Part 111 argues that, despite its cursory and marginalized treatment
in the courts, the effective exclusion of millions from the meaningful
use of much of the civil justice system presents an immensely serious
constitutional question. It is almost too obvious to state that those
forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial
process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Just as
obvious, the right to be heard must include more than the bare
possibility of appearing in person before the tribunal. As the Supreme
Court has regularly concluded in the criminal context, the "assistance
of counsel is often a requisite to the very existence of a fair trial."A
We have created, at the hands of the state, overarching tribunals for
the resolution of private and public disputes. In that process, we made
them complex, cumbersome, professionally technical, and expensive.
We could, perhaps, have done otherwise. But having chosen our
course, state and federal actors should surely be hard-pressed to claim
it is of no constitutional moment that the system is knowingly and
continually rendered inaccessible to many of the citizens for whom it
was designed.
43 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country."); Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Enumerated Powers":
In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752, 777 (1995) (describing the
advantages of federalism as including experimentation among the states in policy).
" See infra notes 93-99.
4 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972).
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To illustrate the point, I will briefly explore examples of the work
of four of the twentieth century's greatest jurists-Felix Frankfurter,
John Marshall Harlan, William 0. Douglas, and William Brennan-
who struggled, tentatively but perceptively, to square realistic claims
of procedural fairness with long-standing economic exclusions from
the civil justice system. Though advancing dramatically different
visions of judicial power and predisposition, each sought to mitigate
the most obvious and debilitating instances of economic exclusion.46
The steps they advocated said much about their respective approaches
to constitutional decision making. What none of them would have
guessed, I'm certain, is that their successors, equally schooled in the
challenges and rigors of meaningful constitutional review, would
simply have cast their gaze away and said, "no matter."
Part IV sketches the fundaments of a constitutional right to civil
counsel in cases where it is essential to assure the ability to
meaningfully participate in the proffered judicial forum. It is not my
purpose to exhaustively outline the categories of controversies or
interests that should compel an affirmative right to counsel. It is,
rather, to make the broad claim that the due process guarantee
necessarily includes a derivative right to effective access-a right that
implicates the very legitimacy of the process of dispute resolution.
There may be an array of methods to meet its demands, but a realistic
interpretation of due process of law begins with an exploration of the
fairness of the state-directed forum if counsel is not provided. It asks
whether it is realistic to assume that the judicial forum can be
successfully navigated without the aid of counsel. If not, the right to a
meaningful hearing is, of course, impaired.
Finally, in Part V, I argue that the failure to constitutionalize a
right of effective access in civil cases does not represent a mere want
of generosity or failure to assure some idealized, progressive vision of
judicial power. It undermines the very legitimacy of a system
dependent upon the promise of due process of law. Without a vibrant
commitment to meaningful participation for all, the validity of the
state's assumed and exercised authority over the coercive resolution
of civil disputes is drawn into serious and defining question.
Wholesale judicial abdication, in the face of the crushing challenges
of equal access to civil justice, is brutally unacceptable. It mocks the
entirety of the judicial enterprise. It suggests that in the American
version of fundamental fairness, poor people do not count. It marks us
as an enemy to equality, rather than apostle for it. Judges are
responsible for the dramatic gulf that now exists between our words
4 See discussion infra pp. 349-54.
3352010]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
and our deeds. They aren't immune from it. Ignoring its cruelty
violates their charge and demeans our national promise.
I. THE EXPLORATION AND REJECTION OF A DERIVATIVE RIGHT TO
CIVIL COUNSEL
The United States Supreme Court's two most famous
right-to-counsel cases in the criminal context, Powell v. Alabama4 7
and Gideon v. Wainwright,48 are steeped in both realism and the
profound seriousness of constitutional obligation. Powell, the
Scottsboro decision from the 1930s, held that Alabama violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to
provide counsel in a capital case.49 Powell's holding was rooted
squarely in the notion of a meaningful hearing:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law. . . . He lacks . . . the
. . . knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even
though he have a perfect one. . . . [H]e faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much
more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate ....
. . . [T]he Sixth Amendment relates only to criminal
prosecutions, . . . "but . .. that provision was inserted in the
Constitution because the assistance of counsel was
recognized as essential to any fair trial of a case against a
prisoner."50
Gideon, the landmark Warren Court ruling extending the right to
provided counsel for indigents in felonies, hewed the same line:
[A]ny person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth....
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions
47 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
4 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
49 Powell, 287 U.S. at 71.
5 Id. at 68-70 (quoting Ex parte Chin Loy You, 223 F. 833, 838 (D. Mass. 1915))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
336 [Vol. 60:2
JUDICIAL ABDICATION AND EQUAL ACCESS
and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and
substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before
impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal
before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor
man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a
lawyer to assist him.
Almost a decade later, Argersinger v. Hamlin5 2 extended the right
to any criminal trial where the accused might be deprived of his
liberty.53 It did so for similar reasons. Counsel, the Court concluded,
may well be necessary for a fair trial even in a minor prosecution. In
support of this conclusion, the Court asserted: "We are by no means
convinced that [the] legal . . . questions . . . [presented in petty cases]
are any less complex than . . . [in felonies]. . . . Counsel is needed so
that the accused may know precisely what he is doing ... and. . . [be]
treated fairly by the [state]."
Gideon and Argersinger, perhaps unsurprisingly, echo the thrust of
the Warren Court' s55 most defining opinion, Brown v. Board of
Education.56 They seek to look past formalism and tradition in a quest
for actual fairness. They reject the belief that the American
Constitution can be relegated to dismissible hypocrisy. The Justices
declared, principally, that they were unwilling to be the only people in
the nation pretending that our criminal justice system could be fairly
navigated without the aid of a lawyer. And they seemed to say, again
with Brown, that in a serious constitutional democracy, everyone
counts--even those at the bottom.
The concern for those at the bottom led, somewhat
contemporaneously, to the development of a second line of cases that
embraced equality analysis more overtly and moved past any claimed
linkage to the Sixth Amendment. Griffin v. Illinois invalidated a
transcript funding requirement to perfect appeal in criminal cases."
Justice Black, announcing the Court's judgment, observed that
"[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike
51 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
52 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
s3 Id. at 37 ("We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person
may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless
he was represented by counsel at his trial.").
5 Id. at 33-34.
s5 Argersinger was written in 1972, but its author was Justice Douglas-and the opinion
was joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall and Blackmun. Chief Justice Burger
concurred and Justices Powell and Rehnquist concurred in the result.
56 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding state-imposed racial segregation in public education
unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
57 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
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is an age-old problem."58 The imposition of costs would render the
right of appeal a "meaningless promise[] to the poor." 59 Such an
exclusion "is a misfit in a country dedicated to affording equal justice
to all and special privileges to none . . . ."6 For, famously, "[t]here
can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on
the amount of money he has."6 '
In Douglas v. California,62 the Court used Griffin's central
premises to demand the appointment of counsel in criminal appeals,
noting that "[i]n either case the evil is the same: discrimination
against the indigent."63 Similarly, in Mayer v. City of Chicago,4 the
Court required a local government to "provide a full verbatim record
where . . . necessary to assure [an] indigent as effective an appeal as
[those who] pay [their] own way." 65 And then Boddie v. Connecticut66
effectively drew on both lines of decisions to invalidate a filing fee in
divorce cases. 67 The offending fee denied indigent litigants "an
opportunity . . . granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner" to assert their fundamental constitutional interests.6 8 In
actual implementation, it worked to "block[] access to the judicial
process" by the poor.6 9 A significant basis was thus laid for two
complementary principles: (a) the failure to assure access to counsel
in complex legal proceedings can effectively deny the right to fair
trial; and (b) there are limits on the extent to which the Constitution
will countenance differing systems of justice for the rich and poor.
Unfortunately, Boddie represented the high-water mark of the
Supreme Court's moves toward equal access to justice. Two years
later, in United States v. Kras,70 the Court upheld a fee requirement
that prevented an indigent from filing for bankruptcy.71 Limiting
Boddie to its "marital relationship" context, the Court "decline[d] to
5 Id. at 16.
5 Id. at 17.
6o Id. at 19.
61 Id.
62 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
63 Id. at 355 (finding an appeal as of right from a conviction, without benefit of appellate
counsel, violates the Sixth Amendment right to attorney). But see Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,
617-19 (1974) (refusing to extend Douglas to discretionary appeals).
- 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
65 Id. at 195.
- 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
67 See id. at 374.
6 Id. at 378 (alteration in original) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552
(1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
69 Id. at 382.
7o 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
7' See id. at 450.
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extend [its] principle . . . to the no-asset bankruptcy proceeding." 72
Casting aside the due process inquiry's demand for actual and
meaningful participation, Justice Blackmun wrote, "[h]owever
unrealistic the remedy may be in a particular situation, a debtor, in
theory, and often in actuality, may adjust his debts by negotiat[ing] . .
with his creditors."7 3 Anatole France would have been proud.74 In
dissent, Justice Stewart moaned angrily that the majority was
permitting Congress to decide that "some ... are too poor even to go
bankrupt."7 1
Next, almost to prove Stewart's point, Ortwein v. Schwab ruled
that a twenty-five-dollar filing fee could constitutionally bar access to
sue over welfare benefits.76 Justice Douglas fumed in dissent over the
move to render justice "the private preserve [of] the affluent,"77 while
Justice Marshall said, simply, that "important benefits [have been]
taken . .. without affording ... a chance to contest the legality of the
taking in a court of law." 7 8 Thus, Boddie had been successfully
transformed into a narrow privacy ruling, and sham formalism was
warmly embraced.
The final shoe dropped eight years later in Lassiter.79 There, a
closely divided Court rejected an indigent's request for appointed
counsel in a case brought by the state to terminate parental rights.
Although conceding that the complexity and emotion of a termination
proceeding could "overwhelm an uncounseled parent," the majority
chided that no "specially troublesome" question of law was
presented.8 0 Nominally, Lassiter employed Mathews v. Eldridge's81
well-trod balancing test, exploring "the private interests at stake, the
government's interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead
72 Id. at 444, 450.
7 Id. at 451. Justice Blackmun, however, did not remain satisfied with mere pretense. See
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 37 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Where an
individual's liberty interest assumes sufficiently weighty constitutional significance, and the
State by a formal and adversarial proceeding seeks to curtail that interest, the right to counsel
may be necessary to ensure fundamental fairness.").
74 France once famously quipped that it was "the majestic equality of the laws, which
forbid the rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their
bread." ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95 (Frederic Chapman ed. & Winifred Stephens
trans., 1910) (1894).
7 Kras, 409 U.S. at 457 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
76 410 U.S. 656, 661 (1973) (per curiam).
77 Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954,
961 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
78 Id. at 666 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
7 452 U.S. at 32-33 (holding that, in view of all the circumstances, the trial court did not
deprive Lassiter of due process by failing to appoint counsel for her).
8 Id. at 30, 32.
81 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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to erroneous decisions." 82 But the private interest at stake was
admittedly crucial, the government's goal was consistent with
affording counsel, and the costs entailed were modest. Lassiter looked
like a slam-dunk case for requiring counsel. Without explanation,
however, the Court overlaid the balancing inquiry with a hefty
presumption against the appointment of counsel where there is no risk
of the loss of physical liberty.83 Lassiter taught, immediately, that the
presumption, not the test, is what matters.
Federal cases since have, at best, tinkered at the edges of these
constricted paths. Advocates for appointed counsel attempt to show
that the interests they assert are parallel to "Gideon-blessed" losses of
liberty." Fee-related actions cling close to Boddie's tie to "intrusions
on family relationships." In civil cases generally, however, no
overarching right to counsel is recognized. Nor is any searching
particularized inquiry required to assure the possibility of a fair
hearing. If neither physical liberty nor the tightly drawn family
interest is implicated, the right to civil counsel claim loses.
It is still the case that without a lawyer, the "right to be heard" is
"of little avail," 8 6 and that unless counsel is appointed, it is "an
obvious truth" that no fair trial can be had. Excluding the poor and
near poor from the effective use of much of the civil justice system
remains "a misfit in a country dedicated to affording equal justice to
all and special privileges to none . ... What has changed is that it
no longer matters.
II. LASSITER AND THE STATE COURTS
In the nearly three decades since it was handed down, Lassiter
has-at least as a matter of logic-played out oddly in the
(predominantly) state courts charged with enforcing it. By its terms,
8 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
83 Id. at 26-27.
84 See Steven D. Schwinn, Sidestepping Lassiter on the Path to Civil Gideon: Civil
Douglas, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 217, 219 (2006) ("[A]dvocates seek to demonstrate a
heightened interest on the part of the litigant and ultimately to equate the litigant's interest with
physical liberty.").
8 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996). In the context of a termination-of-parental-
rights case in which transcript costs on appeal were at issue, the Court observed that "[in sum, .
. . this Court has not extended Griffin to the broad array of civil cases. But . .. the Court has
consistently set apart from the mine run of cases those involving . . . intrusions on family
relationships." Id.
8 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
8 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); see also supra text accompanying
notes 47-51 (discussing Powell and Gideon).
8 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (plurality opinion); see also supra text
accompanying notes 57-61 (discussing Griffin).
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Lassiter initiates an open-ended balance to determine whether counsel
is required in civil cases. That weighing process is seemingly not
limited to Lassiter's wrenching facts, a termination of parental-rights
dispute. It is, however, oddly trumped by the implementation of a
presumption against providing a lawyer unless liberty is at risk.
Weighing the demanded presumption against the prescribed balance
is tough sledding-comparing apples and oranges, and balancing
individualized circumstance against broader social cost and concern.
That seems especially to be the case since Lassiter itself presented an
exceptionally strong case under the Mathews balance, but was readily
dismissed by the Court as unworthy of appointed counsel. A thumb, it
appears, presses the scale.
States, perhaps ironically, have reacted strongly to the facts of
Lassiter. A majority, for example, have moved, either by statute or
state constitutional determination, to require the appointment of
counsel for indigents in termination or dependency and neglect
proceedings,89 even though Lassiter did not require it. The reports are
also replete with cases exploring analogous parental or
privacy-related interests.90 And many, unsurprisingly, consider
8 E.g., Brown v. Div. of Family Servs., 803 A.2d 948, 955 (Del. 2002) (stating that, as of
2002, more than half of states had "established a right for indigent parents to be represented by
counsel at State expense in dependency and neglect proceedings," even though doing so is not
required by the Constitution); see also K.P.B. v. D.C.A., 685 So. 2d 750, 752 (Ala. Civ. App.
1996) (holding, on the basis of a prior Alabama Supreme Court decision, that the Alabama
Constitution guarantees counsel for indigents in termination-of-parental-rights cases); In re
K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 283-84 (Alaska 1991) (holding that parents' state constitutional right to
assistance of counsel in termination-of-parental-rights proceedings also applies in the adoption
context); State ex rel. Johnson, 465 So. 2d 134, 138 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that due
process requires appointment of counsel for indigent parents in abandonment proceedings where
the state seeks to terminate parental rights), affd, 475 So. 2d 340 (La. 1985); In re Render, 377
N.W.2d 421, 423 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that Michigan courts disagree with Lassiter's
holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require appointment of counsel in all
termination proceedings); In re A.S.A., 852 P.2d 127, 129 (Mont. 1993) (holding that the
Montana State Constitution's guarantees of due process require parents to be represented by
counsel in parental termination proceedings); In re D.D.F., 801 P.2d 703, 706 (Okla. 1990)
(stating that appointment of counsel in all termination proceedings is required by the Oklahoma
Constitution); Zockert v. Fanning, 800 P.2d 773, 776 (Or. 1990) (remarking that state law
requires the state to provide assistance of counsel in parental termination proceedings in juvenile
court upon request of an indigent parent).
9 See, e.g., Ind. Planned Parenthood Affiliates Ass'n v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127, 1138
(7th Cir. 1983) (holding that statute establishing a judicial bypass procedure for parental
notification requirement for minors seeking abortions impermissibly failed to provide for the
appointment of counsel for the minors); Salas v. Cortez, 593 P.2d 226, 234 (Cal. 1979) (holding
that indigent defendants are entitled to appointed counsel under both federal and state
constitutions in state-initiated paternity actions); In re Jay R., 197 Cal. Rptr. 672, 678 (Ct. App.
1983) (holding that due process requires appointment of counsel for indigent noncustodial
parents in stepparent adoption proceedings); Lavertue v. Niman, 493 A.2d 213, 218-19 (Conn.
1985) (holding that the federal and state constitutions require appointment of counsel for
indigent defendants in state-sponsored paternity actions); Kennedy v. Wood, 439 N.E.2d 1367,
1368-69, 1372 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that in cases where the state brings a paternity
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appointment of counsel in actions that may threaten physical liberty,
such as certain prisoner cases, contempt disputes, and civil
commitment suits.91 A few courts have also been clear that, under
their own constitutional mandates, the Mathews balance is not to be
so readily overcome by a presumption against the appointment of
counsel.92
What state courts haven't done, however, is apply a searching
scrutiny to the tension that occurs in the broad array of civil cases-
beyond the narrow parental privacy interests coincidentally at issue in
Lassiter-when indigents are denied access to a meaningful hearing
because they cannot afford a lawyer. State courts have, perhaps,
over-learned the context of Lassiter's determination and
under-learned the importance of the due process inquiry necessitated
by the denial of representation in the run-of-the-mill civil dispute.93
action on behalf of welfare-recipient mothers, in compliance with Title IV-D of the Social
Security Act, application of Mathews factors establishes that due process requires appointment
of counsel for indigent defendants); Mead v. Batchlor, 460 N.W.2d 493, 504 (Mich. 1990)
(holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits incarceration of
indigent defendants in contempt proceedings for nonpayment of child support if they have been
denied assistance of counsel); In re Fernandez, 399 N.W.2d 459, 461 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that trial court may appoint counsel for indigent noncustodial parent in a stepparent
adoption case); Carroll v. Moore, 423 N.W.2d 757, 776 (Neb. 1988) (holding that due process
requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in paternity proceedings); Pasqua v.
Council, 892 A.2d 663, 674 (N.J. 2006) (holding that federal and state constitutions require
appointment of counsel for indigent parents facing incarceration at child-support enforcement
hearings); Ward v. Jones, 757 N.Y.S.2d 127, 128 (App. Div. 2003) (denying a right to counsel
in case involving child visitation rights); Wake County ex rel. Carrington v. Townes, 293
S.E.2d. 95, 99 (N.C. 1982) (holding that indigent parties do not have an automatic right to
counsel in civil paternity actions, but that the trial court should determine on a case-by-case
basis whether true fairness requires it); Corra v. Coll, 451 A.2d 480, 487 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)
(holding that a Mathews analysis mandates appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in
civil paternity proceedings); Blake v. Blake, 878 S.W.2d 209, 212 (Tex. App. 1994) (holding
that trial court's failure to appoint counsel for allegedly indigent putative father in a civil
paternity action did not violate his substantive due process rights); State v. Santos, 702 P.2d
1179, 1182-83 (Wash. 1985) (holding that a child's interest in paternity proceedings requires
counsel).
91 See Yarbrough v. Superior Court, 702 P.2d 583, 585, 589 (Cal. 1985) (holding that
appointment of counsel may be required, as a last resort, for an indigent prison inmate facing a
civil suit); Sheedy v. Merrimack County Superior Court, 509 A.2d 144, 147-48 (N.H. 1986)
(stating that the indigent are entitled to counsel in complex civil contempt proceedings or when
they are incapable of speaking for themselves); McBride v. McBride, 431 S.E.2d 14, 19-20
(N.C. 1993) (holding that counsel is required for indigent defendants in civil contempt
proceedings that may result in incarceration).
9 See, e.g., O.A.H. v. R.L.A., 712 So. 2d 4, 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that an
indigent, incarcerated parent is entitled to counsel at adoption proceedings that would
involuntarily terminate his or her parental rights); Render, 377 N.W.2d at 424-25 (holding that,
under Michigan law, the parental right to custody of one's child constituted a compelling liberty
interest entitled to constitutional due process protection); Corra, 451 A.2d at 488 (holding that
indigent defendants are entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to counsel in civil paternity
suits).
9 Run-of-the-mill civil cases include those where the possibility of a contingent fee is
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This likely represents, of course, the significant power of Lassiter's
presumption against the appointment of counsel in
non-liberty-threatening civil cases. Although both the Mathews
balance and the presumption against an affirmative right to counsel
matter under Lassiter, the presumption matters a lot more.
Consider, for example, a case like New York City Housing
Authority v. Johnson.94 There, an indigent tenant faced with eviction
from her home was denied access to counsel. Although the New York
Court of Appeals acknowledged that "'eviction from homes' is
ordinarily one of 'the many kinds of private litigation which may
drastically affect indigent litigants,"' it easily concluded that no right
to appointed counsel would be recognized. 5 Never mind that she had
been "haled into court" and that her right to a fair trial was rendered
"a meaningless promise." Or that this occurred only and precisely
because she was poor. The case was simple under the operative
reading of Lassiter. The indigent was not in danger of incarceration,
nor were narrow parental rights threatened. Nothing more was
demanded. But it should have been.96
Of course state tribunals are not relegated, helplessly, to closed
doors and knowing exclusion. Lassiter outlines only the floor-such
as it is--demanded by the Court's tepid reading of the federal Due
Process Clause. States are free to do their own work. Seeing the
disparities and exclusions that mark their civil justice systems at close
hand, state supreme court justices can demand greater steps toward
realism in enforcing their own due process, equality, open courts, 97 or
law of the land98 provisions. If troubled by the tensions and
unavailable to trigger representation.
565 N.Y.S.2d 362 (App. Term 1990).
9 Id. at 364 (quoting In re Smiley, 330 N.E.2d 53, 57 (N.Y. 1975)).
6 It can, of course, be worse. See, for example, City of Moses Lake v. Smith, No.
01-2-007668 (Wash. Ct. App. May 21, 2003), in which the court denied appointed counsel to an
elderly, indigent, and mentally challenged man whose home of fifty years was threatened with
demolition by a city seeking to enforce building code requirements. See "Civil Gideon"
Litigation Pending in Two States, in NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER Ass'N, SPAN UPDATE 3,
3 (2003), http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1059747591.39/SPAN%2OJuly%2003%20%
231.pdf (noting that as the appeal was pending, the man died and the Washington Supreme
Court remanded the case to the appellate court for consideration whether the man's death
rendered the case moot).
97 My home state of North Carolina's constitution explicitly requires that courts be open.
According to N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 18: "All courts shall be open; every person for an injury done
to him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law; and
right and justice shall be administered without favor, denial or delay."
98 See, e.g., N.C. CONST. art. L § 19 ("No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized
of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his
life, liberty or property, but by the law of the land."). The North Carolina constitution also
indicates that "[a] frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is absolutely necessary to
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contradictions of Lassiter's tangle of feckless balances and
presumptions, jurists can overtly explore the necessities of
representation against the challenges of cost. If state judges are
unsatisfied with standards that result in the wholesale marginalization
of classes of litigants, they are given broader reign to actually demand
constitutional compliance. If justices are committed to a robust, rather
than moribund, vision of undergirding adjudicatory fairness, they are
empowered to seek it.99 Sadly, they have not done so. Instead, they
have cabined the debate over the wrenching question of equal justice
into the exceedingly confined quarters of the appropriate bounds of
rights of paternity and family association-thus relegating the
constitutional access to a subset of privacy law. As a result, the
"age-old problem" of "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike"1oo has been removed from the American
constitutional agenda.
III. THE CHALLENGE OF MEANINGFUL ACCESS TO JUSTICE
It is, perhaps, too glib to dismiss the effective
de-constitutionalization of access to civil justice by pointing out that
it marginalizes both the interests and the dignity of a great portion of
the American populace-though I'm unsure why. It is also easy to
note that due process of law is described as a progressive and
evolving notion, asking of each generation a reexamination of the
inadequacies of the patterns and acceptances of established
practice.101 These claims are likely ambitious, even ennobling. But
preserve the blessings of liberty." N.C. CONST. ART. I, § 35.
9 See, e.g., In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 278 (Alaska 1991) (rejecting the lassiter
presumption under the Alaska constitution and holding that the lower court violated an indigent
father's due process rights under the Alaska constitution when the court failed to appoint an
attorney for a hearing that removed the father's parental rights); In re Jay R., 197 Cal. Rptr. 672,
678 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that in actions where a parent could lose all parental rights, a
parent is entitled to counsel if he or she requests it and demonstrates a present indigency).
10 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956) (plurality opinion).
101 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) ("[The Framers of the Constitution]
knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every
generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom."); Griffin, 351 U.S.
at 20-21 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Due process is, perhaps, the least frozen concept of our
law-the least confined to history and the most absorptive of powerful social standards of a
progressive society." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Of course, even a more modest vision
of due process recognizes that newly crafted limitations can be necessary to assure fundamental
fairness. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265 (2009) (holding
that a state judge who was newly elected with aid of enormous campaign contributions from a
defendant in the process of appealing a $50 million adverse jury verdict violated due process by
failing to recuse himself).
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they are soft and grand as well. One need not venture to such bold
terrain to call into question our overarching rejection of a right to civil
counsel.
Justice John Marshall Harlan, the most perceptive and cautious
member of the historic Warren Court, wrote almost forty years ago:
American society, of course, bottoms its systematic definition
of individual rights and duties, as well as its machinery for
dispute settlement, not on custom or the will of strategically
placed individuals, but on the common-law model. It is to
courts, or other quasi-judicial official bodies, that we
ultimately look for the implementation of a regularized,
orderly process of dispute settlement. Within this framework,
those who wrote our original Constitution . .. recognized the
centrality of the concept of due process in the operation of
this system. Without this guarantee that one may not be
deprived of his rights, neither liberty nor property, without
due process of law, the State's monopoly over techniques for
binding conflict resolution could hardly be said to be
acceptable . . . . Only by providing that the social
enforcement mechanism must function strictly within these
bounds can we hope to maintain an ordered society that is
also just. It is upon this premise that this Court has through
years of adjudication put flesh upon the due process
principle.102
And if American courts depend upon the strictures of due process to
assure their legitimacy, nothing is closer to the core commitment to
procedural fairness than the requirement that those seeking "to settle
their claims of right and duty through the judicial process .. . be given
a meaningful opportunity to be heard."103 "Meaningful," of course,
demands the introduction of reality-of actual, concrete
opportunity-into the calculus.1" The right to be heard, as a result,
must secure more than the mere chance of appearing in person before
the tribunal. And, as the Justices have regularly insisted in the
criminal context, the "assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the
very existence of a fair trial."10 5 A hearing would, in many cases, be
to2 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,375 (1971).
03 Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1981) (quoting Boddie, 401 U.S. at 377); see also
Boddie, 401 U.S. at 379 ("[A] State must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to
be heard if it is to fulfill the promise of the Due Process Clause.").
0o See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[Due process of law]
addresses itself to actualities.").
05 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972).
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of little avail, "a worthless thing," and a "meaningless promise[] to
the poor,"'" if it did not include the ability to be represented by a
lawyer.W This is the "obvious truth"108  of modem American
litigation. And that truth is triggered not by the type of case or
substantive interest at stake, but by the foundational procedural due
process requirement of meaningful access to an appropriate judicial
forum. Effectiveness is swamped by the inability to navigate.
Our traditional response to this simple set of facts, in the civil
context, is to ignore it. If pressed we might explain, as Illinois tried to
do in Griffin, that "[the State] is not . . . responsible for [the] disparity
in material circumstances" that makes it impossible for the appellant
to secure counsel.'" That barrier arises from "contingencies of life
which are hardly within the power, let alone the duty, of a State to
correct or cushion."o10 Or, perhaps, as Chief Justice Burger argued in
refusing to require a fee waiver for bankruptcy in United States v.
Kras, "the government . . is no more than the overseer and the
administrator of the process . . . ."'" No denial could be laid at its
hand.
This neutrality thesis was put most directly, perhaps, in a
path-breaking 1979 case before the European Court of Human Rights,
Airey v. Ireland.1 12 There, in a divorce and child-custody action, a
wife was unable to afford counsel, and Ireland did not provide it for
indigents in civil cases." 3 The Irish tribunal held that, since the
appellant could come to court without a lawyer, her right to effective
access under Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was not abridged. Before the
European Court of Human Rights, Ireland defended its position,
saying it had presented "no positive obstacle" 1l4 to Airey's
6 Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17.
07 As the Supreme Court noted in Powell v. Alabama:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend
the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small
and sometimes no skill in the science of law. . . . He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932); see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("[Alny
person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him.").
10 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
10 Giffin, 351 U.S. at 23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"OId.
"1 409 U.S. 434, 450 (1973) (Burger, CJ., concurring).
112 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979).
" 3 See id. at 6-7.
11
4 Id. at 14.
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participation: "[Denial] stems not from any act on the part of the
authorities but solely from Mrs. Airey's personal circumstances, a
matter for which Ireland cannot be held responsible. . ..
The European Court soundly rejected Ireland's claim. "Hindrance
in fact," the Court ruled, can "contravene the Convention just like a
legal impediment . . . . 6 Fulfillment "of a duty," in this instance,
"necessitates some positive action on the part of the State . . . [it]
cannot simply remain passive . . . . 7 Here, there is "no room to
distinguish between acts and omissions."' 18
The Airey decision has done much to push Western industrial
democracies a good deal closer to aspirations of equal access to
justice than we have managed in the United States.119 My point,
though, is not to turn, as is now apparently controversial, to foreign
sentiment for authority. Rather, I'm drawn to the clarity in which the
non-obliged, neutral arbiter portrait was presented.
The act-omission dichotomy, as all first-year torts students
understand, can be a slippery one. I'm guessing that the European
Court of Human Rights, in searching for "realistic" and "effective"
participation,120 was right to move past it. But one need not go that far
to demand constitutional accountability in the access to civil justice
cases.
First, American courts, state and federal, readily reject claims to
counsel even in disputes in which the state not only provides the






"8 Id. (citation omitted).
"9 See, e.g., J.G. v. Minister of Health & Cmty. Servs., [1999] 3 S.C.R, 48 (Can.) (holding
that an indigent mother had a constitutional right to state-funded counsel during loss-of-custody
proceedings initiated by the State); Steel & Morris v. United Kingdom, 2005-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 7,
43 (holding that denial of legal counsel to applicants in a defamation lawsuit violated Article 6,
§ 1 and Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms); see also Earl Johnson, Jr., The Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: An International
Perspective, 19 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 341 (1985) (providing an overview of the expansion in
Europe of the right to counsel in civil cases and its possible application to California); Raven
Lidman, Civil Gideon as a Human Right: Is the U.S. Going to Join Step with the Rest of the
Developed World, 15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 769 (2006) (advocating that the U.S.
follow the lead of other countries and guarantee counsel for low-income citizens in civil cases).
For a historical account of historical and global use of court-appointed counsel, see MAURO
CAPPELLETTI ET AL., TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL AID IN
MODERN SOCIETIES (1975).
Furthermore, it should be noted that in 2006, the American Bar Association's Task Force
on Access to Civil Justice reported that Airey "now applies to 41 nations and over 400 million
people . . . and [requires] member states to provide counsel at public expense to indigents in
cases heard in the regular civil courts." ABA TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIvuL JUSTICE, supra
note 13, at 9.
12
0See Airey, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 13.
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housing, forfeiture, and benefits cases121 I have highlighted are
examples. Lassiter, itself, is such a case-no neutral umpire there.
But even beyond these categories, the matter is more complex. We
have created, at the hands of the state, overarching tribunals for the
resolution of private and public disputes. They are, at bottom, the
only effective and ultimate means of finally resolving a massive array
of civil controversies. We have, in turn, assured that these fora are
hugely complicated, cumbersome, mysterious, professionally
technical, adversarial, and expensive. Litigants are assigned the
primary and costly tasks of discovering and asserting the controlling
legal standards, marshalling the relevant facts, organizing them for
presentation, offering them through convoluted and logically peculiar
rules of evidence, overcoming or injecting constraining motions,
arguing compellingly before a jury, and appealing or sustaining the
judgment. Pulling off these steps requires no small measure of
experience, sweat, wit, and expertise. It is as far beyond the kin of
most citizens as brain surgery is to me. That means, of course, that,
without counsel, the door we have theoretically opened is, in practice,
closed shut.
We could, perhaps, have done otherwise. Even now, it would be
possible to dramatically simplify the rules and resolution methods for
large swaths of disputes, making the use of lawyers unnecessary.
Despite the well-understood challenges of access, we have chosen not
to do so. Having followed this path, state and federal actors are now
unable to credibly claim that the justice system, which is knowingly
and continually rendered inaccessible to many of the citizens it is
meant to serve, is a mere reflection of a natural and unobjectionable
neutrality. Rather, the decision to create, direct, operate, subsidize and
maintain a system of civil justice that, on so many fronts, excludes
millions is just that-a decision. To claim that it is anything but the
obligating and knowing action of the state, rather than the product of
some natural, non-ideological, unfolding course of human
enterprise-the fruit of a disengaged "overseer and
administrator"l 22-1s not possible. Or at least it's not candid.
Accordingly, if we are to demand actual, rather than illusory,
opportunities to participate; if we are to concede that the civil legal
system is frequently impossible to navigate without professional
assistance; and if we are to continue to insist, at least rhetorically, that
all of us count, then the present marginalizing operation of the civil
121 See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text; see also United States v. 1604 Oceola,
803 F. Supp. 1194, 1197-98 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (holding that an incarcerated indigent had no
right to counsel in a government-instituted forfeiture action).
'22 United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 450 (1973) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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justice system is unacceptable. The refusal to look this most daunting
of adjudicatory questions squarely in the eye undermines our core
claims to what Justice Harlan characterized as a just, "orderly process
of dispute settlement."1 2 3 The fact that we readily ignore this, perhaps
largest, of constitutional transgressions says much. But ignoring a
contradiction, or an unyielding hypocrisy, doesn't, after all, make it
disappear. That is particularly true when liberties, treasure, dignity,
and confidence in the promise of American constitutional democracy
are lost in the process. Judges-federal, state, Republican, Democrat,
liberal, conservative, activist, passive, hard-nosed or heart-bled-play
the dominant and ultimate role in this profound denial of equal
citizenship. They are charged, in singular ways, to move to address it.
A. An Earlier Moment
But before turning to my own modest proposals to begin securing
more effective and meaningful opportunities for the poor and near
poor to participate in our civil justice system, I briefly explore a small
corner of constitutional history. I do so not to reveal any enduring due
process standard or to uncover any essential key to the challenges of
equal justice. My path, instead, is one of illustration. We have become
solidly comfortable with a scheme of civil justice that leaves millions
out. There seems little doubt that at least a strong majority of the
present United States Supreme Court considers the tensions of
exclusion beyond its authority and concern. 124 No action, in their
judgment, is demanded. No explanation is even required.
We have never moved as forcefully to challenge economic barriers
to justice as most of our international peers.125 But we have not
always thought it a constitutional question simply to be ignored. For
almost twenty years, four giants of twentieth century American
jurisprudence-Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas, John Harlan,
and William Brennan-struggled, under distinct theories and
predispositions, to begin to match vital claims of procedural fairness
and economic equality with the harsh realities of traditional exclusion
from the operation of the civil justice system. Each rebelled at this
"misfit in a country dedicated to affording equal justice to all."1 2 6 But
they acted tentatively, preliminarily. A more realistic and inclusive
theory of constitutionalism, they thought, demanded more broadly
12 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971); see also infra text accompanying
notes 162-71 (discussing Justice Harlan's opinion in Boddie).
2 4 Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
125 See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
1
26Boddie, 401 U.S. at 383 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12, 19 (1956)).
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opened doors. How widely and how quickly those doors should be
opened was another matter. Their struggles demonstrate both the
complexity and the import of the search.
The period of the United States Supreme Court's greatest focus on
questions of economic burden and exclusion coincided,
unsurprisingly, with the tenure of the Warren Court. The Court
decided Griffin v. Illinois, requiring waiver of a transcript fee for
criminal appeals in 1956.127 Gideon v. Wainwright28 and Douglas v.
California,129 both assuring a right to counsel for indigents in criminal
trials and appeals, came in 1963.130 Harper v. Board of Elections
invalidated the poll tax in 1966131 and, in 1969, Shapiro v. Thompson
prevented some forms of discrimination in welfare programs by
outlawing a waiting-period requirement that precluded families from
receiving basic welfare benefits until they had been residents of the
state for one full year.132 The following year, Goldberg v. Kelly
increased procedural protections for the poor. 13 3 Mayer v. Chicago,
134requiring an adequate appeal transcript in non-felony cases,, and
Boddie v. Connecticut, rejecting a filing fee in divorce actions,135
were handed down in 1971. Almost the entire Supreme Courtl3 6 had
come to see marked tensions between an array of traditional patterns
and practices which marginalized the poor and newly announced
constitutional commitments to fair processes, equal dignity,
meaningful participation, and actual opportunity. The Justices
demonstrated powerfully divergent views and advocated strongly
disparate tools to begin to bridge the chasm. They did not, however,
believe that challenges could be ignored.
Felix Frankfurter, for example, at least when he took his seat on
the Court, was hardly an advocate of bold judicial power. 137 He
fretted over the dangers of stepping beyond accepted visions of the
127 351 U.S. 12, 18-20 (1956).
128 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
129 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
13
0 See id. at 356-58; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343-45.
131383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
132 394 U.S. 618, 642-44 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974).
'3 397 U.S. 254, 269-71 (1970) (requiring a meaningful pre-termination hearing prior to
cessation of public assistance payments).
1-4404 U.S. 189, 196-99 (1971).
13 401 U.S. 371, 380-83 (1971).
136 Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, for example, was a unanimous decision.
137 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266-67 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the delineation of voting districts in the South was not a question for the courts);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 550-56 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (upholding
convictions under the Smith Act).
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judicial role,'38 obsessed about the traditions of English-speaking
jurisprudence, 139 and sought, relentlessly, to preserve what he
regarded as the essential institutional capital of the federal courts.14t
And, of course, he railed at what he deemed the simplistic
declarations of Justices Hugo Black and William Douglas. 14 1
But in Griffin v. Illinois, he wrote separately (ever reluctant to join
an opinion by Justice Black) that the charge of constitutional review
mandated that the Court refuse to be "willfully blind" to the impact of
costly appellate procedures on the poor.142 The "[s]tate need not
equalize economic conditions. A man of means may be able to afford
the retention of an expensive, able counsel not within reach of a poor
man's purse."1 4 3 But when the government "deems it wise and just
that convictions be susceptible to review by an appellate court, it
cannot by force of its exactions . . . produce such a squalid
discrimination." 144
Beyond that, he sought to avoid broad pronouncement. It is "not
for us," he claimed, "to tell Illinois what means are open to the
indigent" to assure effective participation. 14 5 The state could, no
doubt, "find within the existing resources of Illinois law" ample
means to satisfy the demands of "equal protection of the laws."146
Justice Douglas, on the other hand, seemed purposefully to seek
the boldest stroke. He signed on to his partner's (Justice Black)
opinion in Griffin,147 of course, but then moved forcefully to extend it
in Douglas v. California.14 8 Denying counsel on appeal was "at least
as invidious" as the demand for a transcript, he concluded. 14 9 "In
either case, the evil is the same: discrimination against the
indigent."150 Lines can be drawn, "[b]ut where the merits of the one
and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit
' 38 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 266-67 (1963) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (urging court not to
enter re-districting frays).
139 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 66-68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(arguing, after a lengthy analysis of American constitutional jurisprudence, that the Fifth
Amendment did not apply to the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
140 See Dennis, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (Frankfurter, J. concurring)
141 See, e.g., id. at 550-56 (advocating a timid and limited interpretation of the First
Amendment to protect Supreme Court's institutional reputation).
142 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment).
143 Id.
144 Id. at 23-24.
145 Id. at 24.
14 Id. at 25.
147 See id. at 13.
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of counsel," an unconstitutional distinction has been wrought
"between rich and poor."' 5'
In Argersinger v. Hamlin,152  Douglas pushed past the
felony-misdemeanor line to require counsel in any case threatening
imprisonment. He reasoned that "[c]ounsel is needed so that the
accused may know precisely what he is doing ... so that he is treated
fairly by the prosecution." 53 A lawyer is "requisite to the very
existence of a fair trial."1 54 The same year, he thought the majority
opinion in Boddie too cramped. There, the inquiry, at least for
Douglas, was simple. The "more affluent can obtain a divorce; the
poor cannot."455 The "invidious discrimination [is] based on" a
forbidden category-"poverty." 1 56 Ever aggressive, he would not
limit the holding to the marriage relationship-"[flishing may be
equally important to some communities,"157 but "[a]ffluence does not
pass muster" to determine effective access to the judiciary. 58
John Harlan was, in all likelihood, the most penetratingly
thoughtful Justice of the Warren era. He would also frequently be
regarded as conservative.159 He was Frankfurter without the
pretension. Surely, the closest thing to a "judge's judge" on the
tribunal. He was a writer of consummate skill and a thinker of equal
determination. He dissented in Douglas v. California,160 fearing the
majority's hard rule would discourage states from "making some
effort to redress [the effects of] economic imbalances" though the
efforts fell short of eliminating such imbalances entirely. 161
Harlan's opinion for the Court in Boddie v. Connecticut is one of
the most elegant in our constitutional jurisprudence.162 In it, he linked
the searching, judicially oriented demand for actual fairness in
process to the Court's legitimacy in carrying out its monopoly over
'' Id. at 357 (emphasis omitted).
152407 U.S. 25 (1972).
1
5 3 Id. at 34.
154 Id. at 31.
'55 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 384 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring in result).
'
56 Id. at 386.
'
57 Id. at 385.
'
58 Id. at 386.
'59 See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 330-40 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that, contrary to the majority's assertion, the Equal Protection Clause did not support a
requirement that state legislatures be apportioned to guarantee that all voters have equal voice,
and rather, that states are merely required to choose an electoral legislative structure that
rationally comports with the needs of its citizens). Earl Warren regarded Baker as the most
important case of his tenure.
'0 372 U.S. 353, 360-67 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
161 Id. at 361.
162 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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techniques for binding conflict resolution.16 3 Particularly when, as in
divorce, "the judicial proceeding becomes the only effective means of
resolving the dispute at hand,"'6 economic exclusion through the
imposition of fees "raises grave problems."l65 Resort to the courts,
then, "is no more voluntary in a realistic sense than [when a]
defendant [is] called upon to defend his interests in court" 66 at the
hands of the state. To "fulfill the promise of the Due Process
Clause," 6 7 such plaintiffs are, at minimum, entitled to be heard in "an
opportunity . . . granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner."' 68 There is "no necessary connection between a litigant's
assets and the seriousness" of his claim.169
But Harlan was careful in Boddie to avoid what he feared would
be a too-widely opened door. "We do not decide," he warned, "that
access ... to the courts is a right that ... in all circumstances ... may
not be placed beyond the reach of any individual . . . ."170 Instead, he
wrote, "we hold only that a State may not ... pre-empt the right to
dissolve this legal relationship without affording all citizens access to
the means it has prescribed for doing so."171 A serious commitment to
due process for all could not countenance this. Beyond that, Harlan
was unwilling to say more. But he was also unwilling to pretend that
the divorce case before him could be squared with any sensible notion
of equal justice.
Justice Brennan, concurring, thought that Boddie could not be so
easily, or accurately, constrained. More overtly committed to a
Warren Court agenda of egalitarianism,17 2 Brennan argued that the
"[s]tate has an ultimate monopoly [over] all judicial process and [its]
attendant enforcement machinery" 73--at least "if disputes cannot be
successfully settled between the parties."l 74 Divorce, in this sense, is
i
63 See id. at 375-76 ("The legitimacy of the State's monopoly over techniques of final
dispute settlement, even where some are denied access to its use, stands unimpaired where
recognized, effective alternatives for the adjustment of differences remain.").
6 Id. at 376.
165 Id.
6 Id. at 376-77.
16 7 Id. at 379.
'Id. at 378 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
'69Id. at 381.
170 Id. at 382-83.
'17 Id. at 383.
172 See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269-71 (1970) (holding that welfare
recipients were entitled to a pre-termination evidentiary hearing before their benefits could be
terminated); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 197-98 (1962) (holding that Tennessee's failure to
reapportion seats in the General Assembly implicated a constitutional cause of action upon
which appellants were entitled to a trial and decision).
1
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no different than "any other right arising under federal or state
law." 75 Nor, he thought, should the case be addressed simply as a
matter of due process. "Connecticut does not deny a hearing to
everyone in these circumstances," only to those who "fail to pay
certain fees."l76 Instead, Brennan observed that "[c]ourts are the
central dispute-settling institutions in our society. They are bound to
do equal justice under law, to rich and poor alike." 7 Perhaps his
concurring colleague, Justice Douglas, concluded too readily that all
poverty distinctions are "invidious." 7 8 But when a state, via fee,
"determines ... whether [one] gets into court at all," the Constitution
intervenes. 17 9
These large judicial figures played ample roles in this nation's
opening chapters attempting to square increasingly robust and
meaningful notions of equality and fairness with historical patterns of
economic exclusion and deprivation. They were unwilling to pretend,
across an array of fronts, that dramatic differences in condition had no
actual and determinative impact on constitutional compliance.
Moving past a veil of formalism and facade, they demanded steps be
taken to greater align constitutional aspiration with practical realities
of government process. Still, they recognized their ordered responses
to be small ones. Each, in disparate ways, sought to infuse greater
access and procedural vibrancy without forcing dramatic and
unilateral change. They did not believe, it is obvious to state, that
their modest measures would be the end of a march toward the
fulfillment of a command of equal justice. Sadly, on this front, they
were wrong.
IV. A DERIVATIVE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
demand, without a doubt, that those seeking to "settle their claims of
right and duty through the judicial process must be given a
meaningful opportunity to be heard."'80 I have attempted to argue that
in a broad array of civil actions, a meaningful and effective
opportunity to participate will also include a derivative right to the
appointment of counsel for the indigent. Otherwise, the majestic
promise of due process of law becomes empty and hollow, mocking
constitutionalism rather than fulfilling it. This would not mean that a
1s Id.
7
6 Id. at 388.
" Id.
1
78 See id. at 386 (Douglas, J., concurring).
'79 Id. at 389.
0Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 6 (1981) (quoting Boddie, 401 U.S. at 377).
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lawyer must be provided by the state in all cases. When judicial fora
and standards can be rendered readily navigable by pro se litigants, no
right of representation is triggered. But when the absence of counsel
works to debar the actual and effective use of the judicial forum, due
process of law is denied.
That is, of course, rather easily (and circularly) stated. And it is not
my purpose here to exhaustively outline the categories of
controversies or interests that should compel affirmative access to
counsel. It is, rather, to make the broader claim that the due process
guarantee, in the judicial context, necessarily includes a derivative
right to effective access essential to the asserted legitimacy of the
work of American courts. As in non-judicial contexts, there may be a
wide menu of methods to assure meaningful participation by those
without means. What cannot be done, consistent with any serious
scheme of procedural fairness, is simply to ignore or reject claims to
meaningful access with the back of the judicial hand. Lassiter allows
that, but due process of law doesn't.
In this sense, the right to counsel is a component of procedural
fairness. It is triggered not merely by the type of case or interest at
stake-paternity, divorce, child custody, contract, civil
commitment-but by the manner of the potential deprivation.
Accordingly, though I am strongly drawn to proposals like the
American Bar Association's civil Gideon resolution-which calls for
a right to counsel in cases involving "basic human needs," such as
"shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody" 81-a derivative
constitutional right to counsel likely proceeds from the opposite
direction. 182 It explores the fairness of the state's proffered forum, if
1
8 1 ABA TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 1.
182I think I would say the same thing about the excellent "Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel
Act" recently enacted in California. CAL GOV'T CODE § 68651 (West Supp. 2010). As enacted,
the law directs the California Judicial Council to develop one or more pilot projects, which will
be designed to
address the substantial inequities in timely and effective access to justice that often
give rise to an undue risk of erroneous decision because of the nature and complexity
of the law and the proceeding or disparities between the parties in education,
sophistication, language proficiency, legal representation, access to self-help, and
alternative dispute resolution services.
Id. § 68651(b)(1). In determining the which pilot projects to pursue, the Judicial Council is to
consider:
(A) The likelihood that representation in the proposed case type tends to affect
whether a party prevails or otherwise obtains a significantly more favorable outcome
in a matter in which they would otherwise frequently have judgment entered against
them or suffer the deprivation of the basic human need at issue.
(B) The likelihood of reducing the risk of erroneous decision.
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counsel is not assured. That entails an examination of the complexity
of the procedures employed, the difficulty of the legal standards
implicated, the likely necessity for expert analysis, the sophistication
of the litigant, whether the opposing party is represented by counsel,
and the like. Airey's progeny, for example, have indicated that "the
provision of legal aid . . . must be determined . .. [by] the particular
facts and circumstances... , the complexity of the relevant law ...
and the applicant's capacity to represent him or herself effectively."183
The focal point, though, is whether it is realistic, or merely cynical, to
assume that the judicial forum can be successfully navigated by a
litigant without the assistance of a lawyer.
Federal cases interpreting the massively underemployed in forma
pauperis statuteM point in the right direction. In Tabron v. Grace,185
for example, the Third Circuit indicated that, in an indigent prisoner
§ 1983 case, once a trial court determines a claim has potential merit,
a court's decision to appoint counsel should be driven by the
following factors:
(1) The plaintiffs ability to present the case
(2) The difficulty of the legal issues
(3) The degree to which factual investigation will be necessary
and the litigants' ability to conduct such investigation
(4) The plaintiff s ability to retain counsel on his own
(5) The extent to which the case is likely to turn on credibility
determinations, and
(C) The nature and severity of potential consequences for the unrepresented party
regarding the basic human need at stake if representation is not provided.
(D) Whether the provision of legal services may eliminate or reduce the potential
need for and cost of public social services regarding the basic human need at stake
for the client and others in the client's household.
(E) The unmet need for legal services in the geographic area to be served.
(F) The availability and effectiveness of other types of court services, such as
self-help.
Id. § 68651 (b)(5).
83 Steel & Morris v. United Kingdom, 2005-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 7, 28 (2005) (citations
omitted) (granting counsel for indigent defendant in civil libel case brought by McDonalds).
1-28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (2006) ("The court may request an attorney to represent any
person unable to afford counsel."); see also United States v. 1604 Oceola, 803 F. Supp. 1194,
1198 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (observing that, when deciding whether to request an attorney to
represent an indigent party, a court should consider the type and complexity of the case and the
abilities of the individuals bringing the case).
18 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993).
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(6) Whether the case will require expert testimony. 18 6
Such a list, of course, is neither exhaustive nor unfailingly
illuminating. And it would not mean that the importance of the
interest at stake is irrelevant to the due process determination.
Mathews v. Eldridge, it will be recalled, turns on "the private interest
. . . affected by the official action," the "risk of an erroneous
deprivation" of the private interest, and the "fiscal and administrative
burdens" additional procedures would entail.187 Some matters may be
sufficiently insignificant to be deemed beyond the call of a right to
counsel. Screening methods may be appropriate to assure the
effective deployment of limited public resources. Deference toward
good-faith state and federal efforts to assure adequate representation
would surely be sensible.188 But if a Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment
liberty or property interest is implicated, and if the state or federal
courts are available for the resolution of disputes by those who can
afford counsel, the right to a fair hearing should not be rendered
"meaningless" or "of little avail" because so many can't afford to pay
the fare.
CONCLUSION: A BREACH OF JUDICIAL DUTY
The failure to constitutionalize the question of access to civil
justice is not merely a want of generosity, faddishness, political
correctness, or even compassion. It directly undermines the
legitimacy of a public dispute-resolution system dependent upon the
promise of due process of law. It abandons a central component of the
American judiciary's foundational search for actual, rather than
nominal, fairness. It relegates much of the judiciary's charge to a
pretense "hardly acceptable" as an underpinning for the exercise of
judicial power. 89 Nothing is closer to the core of judicial function
than the assurance of the basic fairness of the courts' own processes.
It is, as Justice Harlan wrote, only through a penetrating demand for
effective and meaningful participation in our "social enforcement
18 See id. at 156-57; see also Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 457 (3d Cir. 1997) (listing
similar factors).
M 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
18See, e.g., Steel & Morris v. United Kingdom, 2005-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 7, 29 (2005) ("[I]t is
not incumbent on the State to seek through the use of public funds to ensure total equality of
arms between the assisted person and the opposing party, as long as each side is afforded a
reasonable opportunity to present his or her case under conditions that do not place him or her at
a substantial disadvantage vis-a-vis the adversary." (citations omitted)).
89See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971) ("Without this guarantee that one
may not be deprived of his rights, neither liberty nor property, without due process of law, the
State's monopoly over techniques for binding conflict resolution could hardly be said to be
acceptable under our scheme of things.").
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mechanism" that we can "hope to maintain an ordered society that is
also just." 90 Thus, examining whether all litigants enjoy a right to
meaningfully participate in the judicial process is a central part of
judges' obligation. It is not simply a question for others.
To make the point from a different direction, think of the Supreme
Court's testy opinion in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez.191 There,
the Justices invalidated a congressional attempt to limit the ability of
Legal Services lawyers to pursue certain arguments-including
challenging the constitutionality of certain welfare laws.192 Writing
for the majority, Justice Kennedy observed that "[t]he restriction
imposed by the statute . .. threatens severe impairment of the judicial
function." 93 He further noted:
[t]he disability is inconsistent with the proposition that
attorneys should present all the reasonable and well-grounded
arguments necessary for proper resolution of the case. By
seeking to prohibit the analysis of certain legal issues and to
truncate presentation to the courts, the enactment under
review prohibits speech and expression upon which courts
must depend for the proper exercise of the judicial power. 19 4
The heavy-handed welfare-reform law in Velazquez surely
impaired both norms of due process and freedom of expression. But,
as the opinion revealed, it also transgressed a constitutionally
mandated separation of powers. It invaded the core judicial
competency, and judicial responsibility, to assure that the avenues of
information "upon which courts must depend for the proper exercise
of the judicial power" are effectively opened. When courts allow the
civil justice system to operate in ways that, for indigent litigants,
reduce the demand for a "fair trial" and "meaningful hearing" to a
"worthless thing," 9 5 they likewise restrict the data necessary to
property and effectively adjudicate. It is not made more
constitutionally palatable because judges have a closer, more
pervasive, and directly informed picture of the resulting exclusion. 19 6
19oId.
191531 U.S. 533 (2001).
' See id. at 546-49.
193Id. at 546.
'MId. at 545.
95Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956).
'1See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 532 (2004) (dealing with an Americans with
Disabilities Act claim over access to court buildings, and stating that, "[the] duty to
accommodate is perfectly consistent with the well-established due process principle that, 'within
the limits of practicability, a State must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be
heard' in its courts."). Lane further stated:
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The wages of judicial abdication are, no doubt, enormous. Denials
of meaningful access are, of course, individual and particularized.
Litigants, or potential ones, effectively lose their ability to assert or
protect various legally recognized interests. To those specific
indigents, injuries occur that would not have been sustained if they
were given the tools necessary to deploy the process created to assure
their interests. Those wounds can be tragic. But it is also impossible
to ignore the broader, systemic loss. Huge numbers of poor and near
poor Americans are, in effect, turned away from the state schemes
designed to resolve their legal disputes. What we characterize as
"equal justice under law" is riddled with a massive exception, an
undermining asterisk. As every lawyer and judge knows, neither the
billable hour nor the contingent fee covers the waterfront of American
legal disputes. We leave millions unrepresented, frequently, on the
most pressing issues of life. We do so recognizing that the
consequences resulting from such legal contests may be more
far-reaching, more devastating, and more permanent than many
categories of criminal cases for which counsel is appointed.197 We do
this claiming, extolling, and allegedly exporting an undergirding
fealty to equal justice under law. The system of justice we deploy is
powerfully, systematically, and tragically at odds with what we say
we are.
Nor do we compare favorably with our fellows. The American Bar
Association reports that "[m]ost European and Commonwealth
countries have had a right to counsel in civil cases for decades or even
centuries . . . ."198 In rulings that bind over forty nations and 400
million people, the European Court of Human Rights has determined
that indigents fail to receive "a fair hearing" unless represented by
counsel provided at public expense.199 Great Britain spends sixteen
[Tihis duty to accommodate is perfectly consistent with well-established due process
principle that "within the limits of practicability, a State must afford to all
individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard" in its courts . . . . Each of these
cases [recognizing affirmative obligations necessary to facilitate access to courts]
makes clear that ordinary considerations of cost and convenience alone cannot justify
a State's failure to provide individuals with a meaningful right of access to the
courts.
Id. at 532-33 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).
19
7 See Douglas J. Besharov, Terminating Parental Rights: The Indigent Parent's Right to
Counsel After Lassiter v. North Carolina, 15 FAM. L.Q. 205, 221 (1981) ("Lassiter, for all
practical purposes, stands for the proposition that a drunken driver's night in the cooler is a
greater deprivation of liberty than a parent's permanent loss of rights in a child.").
98 ABA TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVE JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 3.
'1'See, e.g., Steel & Morris v. United Kingdom, 2005-fl Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 7, 43
(holding that denial of legal counsel in a defamation lawsuit deprived the applicants of the
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times as much as we do per capita on legal services for the poor, New
Zealand spends six times as much, and Canada spends three times as
much. 200 We advertise our commitment to equal justice more proudly
and more vocally than any other nation. Sadly, we are satisfied with
mere advertising. American jurists have found the inconsistency
between our declared constitutional standards of inclusion and the
realities of persistent marginalization to be acceptable and
untroubling. Most of their peers from other industrial democracies
have not. We shall have a difficult time explaining that to our children
and to ourselves.
It is true, thankfully, that determined efforts to demand, lobby for,
organize to secure, and, of course, to selflessly provide, an American
right to civil counsel span the nation.20 1 They have done so for
decades.202 Activists, scholars, bar leaders, legal services providers,
opportunity to effectively present their case before a court); Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A), at 14 (1979) (holding that Ireland's failure to provide counsel in a child-custody case
resulted in a mother's inability to effectively exercise her right of access to the court); see also
J.G. v. Minister of Health & Cmty. Servs., [1999] 3 S.C.R 46,48 (Can.) (finding a constitutional
right to state-funded counsel during loss-of-custody proceedings initiated by the State); cf also
Johnson, supra note 18, at S88-91 (discussing how other democratic countries have greater
access to justice for the poor than the United States); Francis William O'Brien, Why Not
Appointed Counsel in Civil Cases? The Swiss Approach, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1967) (discussing
how the Swiss Constitution guarantees the right to counsel in civil, but not criminal cases).
200 RHODE, supra note 12, at 374.
201 See, e.g., An Obvious Truth, supra note 23, at 1 (presenting a conference dedicated to
advocating a right to civil counsel in New York). See also generally American Bar Association,
http://www.abanet.org (last visited Jan. 25, 2010); Brennan Center for Justice, Civil Justice,
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/section/category/civil-justice/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2010)
(explaining the Center's efforts to close the "justice gap" by expanding the types of civil cases
in which indigents have access to counsel); EqualJusticeLibrary.org, http://www.equal
justicelibrary.org (last visited Jan. 25, 2010); National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel,
http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org (last visited Feb. 2, 2010) ("The National Coalition for a
Civil Right to Counsel is committed to ensuring meaningful access to the courts. We work to
expand recognition and implementation of a right to counsel in civil cases."); National Legal
Aid & Defender Association, http://www.nlada.org/About/AboutHistoryDefender (last visited
Feb. 2, 2010) (describing the history of the right to counsel and the problems that persist with
the current system); Public Justice Center, http://www.publicjustice.org (last visited Feb. 2,
2010) (describing the Center as an organization that "seeks to enforce and expand the rights of
people who suffer injustice because of their poverty"); Sargent Shriver National Center on
Poverty Law, http://www.povertylaw.org/about-us (last visited Feb. 2, 2010) ("The mission of
the Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law is to provide national leadership in
identifying, developing, and supporting creative and collaborative approaches to achieve social
and economic justice for low-income people.").
SE.g., Abel, supra note 23; Bruce A. Boyer, Justice, Access to the Courts, and the Right
to Free Counsel for Indigent Parents: The Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services of Durham, 36 LOY. U. CHi. L.J. 363 (2005); Mark D. Esterle, Gideon's
Trumpet Revisited: Protecting the Rights of Indigent Defendants in Paternity Actions, 24 J.
FAM. L. 1 (1985); Earl Johnson, Jr., Will Gideon's Trumpet Sound a New Melody? The
Globalization of Constitutional Values and Its Implications for a Right to Equal Justice in Civil
Cases, 2 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 201 (2003); Rachel Kleinman, Housing Gideon: The Right to
Counsel in Eviction Cases, 31 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1507 (2004); Paul Marvy & Debra Gardner,
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students, consumers, judges, legislators, and ordinary citizens
campaign against the odds to secure a system of justice that more
closely matches the values that we claim define our constitutional
character. I am a devoted fan of these undertakings. I have, to be
candid, participated in them-less effectively, no doubt, than one
would wish-throughout much of my career. These advocates have
come to expect little from our courts and from the judges who run
them, and for good reason. State justices have principally inquired no
further than "what will we be forced to do by our federal
counterparts?" Federal judges, of course, are answerable to a United
States Supreme Court that has consistently shown itself unmoved by
the claims of those at the bottom, and that includes members openly
derisive of concern for the interests of the poor.203 In fact, it is now
A Civil Right to Counsel for the Poor, HUM. RTS., Summer 2005, at 8; Andrew Scherer,
Gideon's Shelter: The Need to Recognize a Right to Counsel for Indigent Defendants in Eviction
Proceedings, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 557 (1988); Robert W. Sweet, Civil Gideon and
Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 503 (1998); Rosalie R. Young, The
Right to Appointed Counsel in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings: The States'
Response to Lassiter, 14 TOuRO L. REv. 247 (1997); Robert J. Derocher, Access to Justice: Is
Civil Gideon a Piece of the Puzzle?, BAR LEADER, July-Aug. 2008, at 11.
203 Justice Thomas, dissenting from the Court's decision in M.L.B v. S.L.J., argued that he
would overrule Griffin v. Illinois and the Court's "fetish for indigency." 519 U.S. 102, 134
(1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 359 (1963)
(Clark, J., dissenting)). He was not, apparently, being ironic. Justice Scalia, dissenting in Brown
v. Legal Foundation of Washington, from an opinion taking the extraordinarily modest step of
upholding Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts (IOLTA) programs, stated:
Perhaps we are witnessing today the emergence of a whole new concept in
Compensation Clause jurisprudence: the Robin Hood Taking, in which the
government's extraction of wealth from those who own it is so cleverly achieved,
and the object of the government's larcenous beneficence is so highly favored by the
courts (taking from the rich to give to indigent defendants) that the normal rules of
the Constitution protecting private property are suspended. One must hope that that
is the case. For to extend to the entire run of Compensation Clause cases the
rationale supporting today's judgment-what the government hath given, the
government may freely take away-would be disastrous.
538 U.S. 216, 252 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also William P. Marshall, The Empty
Promise of Compassionate Conservatism: A Reply to Judge Wilkinson, 90 VA. L. REV. 355
(2004) (discussing Justice Scalia's opinion in Legal Foundation of Washington). And Chief
Justice Roberts famously opened his confirmation hearings by declaring himself a mere "neutral
umpire," stating that:
Judges and justices are servants of the law, not the other way around. Judges are like
umpires. Umpires don't make the rules; they apply them. The role of an umpire and a
judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules. But it is a limited
role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire. Judges have to have the
humility to recognize that they operate within a system of precedent, shaped by other
judges equally striving to live up to the judicial oath.
Roberts: 'My Job Is to Call Balls and Strikes and Not to Pitch or Bat,' CNN, Sept. 12, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/index.html. After a distinguished
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possible to worry that by focusing so much effort on the bar, on law
schools, or in the halls of our legislatures, to press the cause of equal
justice, we have managed to help insulate American judges from a
breach of obligation that undermines the integrity of their processes
as it wounds the nation. Judges are not immune from the huge chasm
that exists between our asserted commitment to equal justice and the
pervasive and continuing harsh reality of our economic exclusion.
They're responsible for it.
career representing the nation's most economically and politically powerful, Roberts'
"neutrality" is apparently unmoved by the exclusion of millions from the effective operation of
the civil justice system.
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